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You and I are highly unlikely to exist in a civilization that has produced
only 70 billion people, yet we find ourselves in just such a civilization. Our
circumstance, which seems difficult to explain, is easily accounted for if (1)
many other civilizations exist and if (2) nearly all of these civilizations (in-
cluding our own) die out sooner than usually thought, i.e., before trillions
of people are produced. Because the combination of (1) and (2) make our
situation likely and alternatives do not, we should drastically increase our
belief that (1) and (2) are true. These results follow immediately when
considering a many worlds version of the “Doomsday Argument” and are
immune to the main criticism of the original Doomsday Argument.
Keywords: doomsday argument, many worlds, multiverse.
I. Introduction
Imagine you are sitting at a table, blindfolded, and that an urn is placed
in front of you. You are told this urn can be one of two types: it is either a
small urn or a large urn. If it is a small urn, it contains 10 balls numbered
1 through 10. If it is a large urn, it contains 1 million balls numbered 1
through 1 million. You currently do not know whether the urn is small
or large, but would like to find out. Suppose you randomly draw one ball
and find it numbered 7. Given your draw, with what probability is the
urn small?
Let T1 and T2 represent the theories that the urn is small and large re-
spectively, and let D represent your data, i.e., that you have drawn the
number 7. Assuming you believe the urn equally likely to be small or large
before you draw a number, then according to Bayes’ Law, your updated
belief in T1 conditioned on observing your data is,
P (T1|D) =
P (D|T1)P (T1)
P (D|T1)P (T1) + P (D|T2)P (T2)
,
=
1/10× 1/2
1/10× 1/2 + 1/106 × 1/2
,
≈ 0.99999.
You therefore should believe the urn is small with almost certainty. Notice
that you have become confident in the size of the urn with only one draw.
Now, multiply the number of balls in each urn by 1010 and imagine they
correspond to birth numbers within our civilization, i.e., Adam drew num-
ber 1, Eve drew number 2, and so on (you and I have drawn numbers
around 7 × 1010). T1 and T2 represent two competing theories, which we
initially treat as equally likely. Under T1, the urn is small and contains
only 1011 numbers, which means only 1011 people will ever exist and our
civilization will die out within the next few centuries. Under T2, the urn
is large and contains 1016 numbers so that our civilization is large and will
continue on for many years into the future. As before, you would like to
determine whether the urn is small or large, i.e., whether our civilization
is small or large.
Given your data, D = 7× 1010, how should you update your belief in T1?
Without any compelling argument to the contrary, you should update it
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as before,
P (T1|D) =
P (D|T1)P (T1)
P (D|T1)P (T1) + P (D|T2)P (T2)
,
=
1/1011 × 1/2
1/1011 × 1/2 + 1/1016 × 1/2
,
≈ 0.99999,
which means you should believe with almost certainty that our civilization
is small and will die out within the next few centuries.
This argument is the Doomsday Argument (DA) as presented in Leslie
(1989) and Leslie (1996).1 The details of the DA can be restructured –
the numbers can be changed, more urn types can be added, etc. – but the
final result remains unchanged: when we condition on our birth number,
we must drastically increase the probability that our civilization will soon
die out.
There are many critiques of the DA, which I will not focus on here (see
Leslie (1996) or Bostrom (2002) for a full treatment). By most accounts,
the DA has stood up to all criticisms except one. As first mentioned in
Dieks (1992) and expanded in Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and Olum
(2002), the DA fails to consider that you are more likely to exist in a
large civilization than a small one. This missing step exactly cancels the
updating of your beliefs so that your original prior is retained.
In this paper, I intend two things: (1) to defend the counter-argument
to the DA developed in Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and Olum (2002),
and (2) to show that this counter-argument does not work when the DA
is modified to allow for many worlds.
The take-home message is the following: given that we exist in a civi-
lization that has produced 70 billion people so far, we should drastically
increase our belief that many other civilizations exist and that nearly all
of these civilizations (including our own) will die out before producing
trillions of people.
1Precursers of the argument are attributed to Carter (see Leslie (1996)) and Neilsen
(1989); see C´irkovic´ (2004) for this specific treatment and Gott (1993) for an alternative
description of the argument.
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II. The Devil’s Existence
The Devil’s Existence (DE) is a thought experiment where you are asked
to determine whether or not the Devil exists (the Devil representing some
doom event). Suppose God creates 1 million rooms, each sequentially
numbered, and that He initially intends to fill each room with one person.
He first goes to room 1 and generates a person inside. He then moves on
to room 2 and does the same, and so on, until the first 10 rooms have been
filled. At this point, if and only if the Devil exists, he arrives on the scene
and destroys the remaining rooms so that no more people are created.
Suppose you have been created and find yourself in room 7. Assuming
you thought it equally likely that the Devil does or does not exist before
considering this information, how likely is it now that the Devil exists?
In order to correctly update your belief in the Devil’s existence, you must
condition on all available information. As stated above, your information
consists of two things: (1) you exist (let E represent that you exist), and
(2) you are in room 7, (let D represent that you are in room 7). If T1 and
T2 are the theories that the Devil does and does not exist, then according
to Bayes’ Law,
P (T1|D,E) =
P (D|E, T1)P (E|T1)P (T1)
P (D|E, T1)P (E|T1)P (T1) + P (D|E, T2)P (E|T2)P (T2)
.
This equation requires that you know the probability of your existence
given that the Devil does and does not exist, P (E|T1) and P (E|T2).
How do you calculate these? One simple solution is to assume you are
equally likely to exist independent of the Devil’s existence, i.e., P (E|T1) =
P (E|T2). When substituting P (E|T1) for P (E|T2) in the above equation,
the probability of your existence drops out,
P (T1|D,E) =
P (D|E, T1)P (T1)
P (D|E, T1)P (T1) + P (D|E, T2)P (T2)
.
Now, your updated belief is easy to calculate. Because you thought it
equally likely that the Devil exists or does not exist, your priors are
P (T1) = P (T2) = 1/2. Because you have a 1 in 10 chance of finding
yourself in room 7 if there are 10 rooms, then P (D|E, T1) = 1/10. Be-
cause you have a 1 in 1 million chance of finding yourself in room 7 if there
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are 1 million rooms, then P (D|E, T2) = 1/10
6. Plugging these in,
P (T1|D,E) =
P (D|E, T1)P (T1)
P (D|E, T1)P (T1) + P (D|E, T2)P (T2)
,
=
1/10× 1/2
1/10× 1/2 + 1/106 × 1/2
,
≈ 0.99999.
Therefore, after discovering that you are in room 7, you should believe
with almost certainty that the Devil exists and your civilization is small.
Here, just as in the case of the urns, doom becomes very likely.
But, is it okay to assume you are equally likely to exist regardless of
the Devil’s existence? Shouldn’t you be more likely to exist if there are
1 million people created rather than only 10? I certainly have a better
chance of winning the lottery if I play 1 million times rather than 10 times,
and my existence seems much like the lottery. Indeed, a large number
of things could have been different such that my parents gave birth to
someone other than me. Out of the set of all the children they could have
produced, I won.
Applying this thought process to the DE, suppose there exists a very large
pool of possible people, N in total, outside of the experiment. When God
generates a person, this means He randomly selects one person from the
pool, embodies him/her, and then places the body in a room. Bartha
and Hitchcock (1999) and Olum (2002) argue that we should reason as if
something like this was the case when analyzing the DE,2 and I agree. I
adopt their stance and leave a defense of this stance until the next section.
Considering existing people as random pulls from the set of N possible
people, the probabilities that you are created in the case of the Devil
existing and not existing are,3
P (E|T1) ≈ 10/N,
2Olum argues this point using a thought experiment calledGod’s Coin Toss ; Bartha
and Hitchcock present a ‘just-so-story’. Here, I have formulated DE because it allows
me to correctly analyze the possibility of many worlds later in the paper.
3I assume these pulls are with replacement. If x is the number of existing people
in theory T , then P (E|T ) = 1 − (1 − 1/N)x. When N ≫ x, as assumed here, then
P (E|T ) ≈ x/N . When the number of existing people is much larger than the number of
possible people, x≫ N , as will happen when considering many worlds, then P (E|T ) ≈
1.
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and
P (E|T2) ≈ 10
6/N.
You have approximately a 10 in N chance of existing if 10 people are
created in total and a 1 million in N chance of existing if 1 million people
are created. Plugging these into Bayes’ Law,
P (T1|D,E) =
P (D|E, T1)P (E|T1)P (T1)
P (D|E, T1)P (E|T1)P (T1) + P (D|E, T2)P (E|T2)P (T2)
,
≈
1/10× 10/N × 1/2
1/10× 10/N × 1/2 + 1/106 × 106/N × 1/2
,
≈ 1/2.
Therefore, discovering that you exist and are in room 7 does not cause a
shift in your beliefs, and you remain undecided about the Devil’s existence.
The Doomsday Argument has failed and doom is averted.
Why did the Doomsday Argument fail? You are much more likely to
discover your room number is 7 under T1 than T2: there is a 1 in 10
chance of being in room 7 if the Devil exists and a 1 in 1 million chance
if the Devil does not exist. Therefore, finding that your room number
is 7 makes the Devil’s existence 100,000 times more likely than his non-
existence. But, you should also take into account that you are more likely
to exist under T2 than T1: 1 million people are created if the Devil does
not exist and only 10 people are created if the Devil does exist. Therefore,
knowing that you exist makes it 100,000 times more likely that the Devil
does not exist. These two probability shifts – one due to finding yourself
in room 7 and the other due to your existence – cancel each other so that
you retain your original beliefs.
If at this point you feel confident that the Doomsday Argument does
not work, you should not remain comfortable for long. If you believe it
possible that many civilizations exist (perhaps in other worlds), then doom
will return.
III. The Presumptuous Philosopher
Although several arguments against Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and
Olum (2002) exist (see Bostrom and C´irkovic´ (2003) and C´irkovic´ (2004)),
there is one argument that has received the most attention. Consider The
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Presumptous Philosopher (PP) as described in Bostrom (2002):
It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the
search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plau-
sible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from
super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very,
very big but finite and there are a total of a trillion trillion
observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very,
very, very big but finite and there are a trillion trillion trillion
observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations are in-
different between these two theories. Physicists are preparing
a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter
the presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is completely un-
necessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already
show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be
true than T1!”
The point is the following. In the DE thought experiment, I stated we
should reason as though each existing person is a random pull from the
set of possible people. Bostrom believes this reasoning is wrong because
it forces anyone adopting it to prefer certain theories over others simply
because they produce more people. He reckons that if T1 and T2 are
otherwise just as likely, but T2 contains 1 trillion times as many people
as T1, then I must believe that T2 is 1 trillion times more likely than
T1 simply due to this fact (which leads to presumptuous conclusions).
Unfortunately, Olum agrees with Bostrom on this point,
For example, suppose I have a crazy theory that each planet
actually has 1010
100
copies of itself on other planes. Suppose
that (as cranks often do) I believe this theory in spite of the
fact that every reputable scientist thinks it is garbage. I could
argue that my theory is very likely to be correct, because the
chance that every reputable scientist is independently wrong
is clearly more than 1 in 1010
100
. To avoid this conclusion, one
must say that the a priori chance that my theory is right is
less than 1 in 1010
100
. It seems hard to have such fantastic
confidence that a theory is wrong, but if we do not allow that,
we shall be prey to the argument above.
But, must we always prefer theories that contain more people if we reason
as though existing people are random pulls from the set of possible people?
No. Here is why:
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A. Sometimes it is Bostrom who is presumptuous
We must be very careful when analyzing theories that posit the existence
of unknown people. For example, suppose the extra people that exist in
T2 possess some characteristic, C, that you, I, and the other people in T1
do not possess. Then T2 would not be more likely than T1. The increased
probability of existence in T2 is exactly cancelled by the decreased proba-
bility of not possessing C in T2. In the DE thought experiment above, C
is ‘having a birth number greater than 10’. As shown above, you do not
prefer T2 to T1 in the DE even though T2 produces more people.
As another example, suppose you are contemplating whether jovians exist,
i.e., whether there are inhabitants of Jupiter.4 If they do exist, then there
are more “people”, so you should increase your belief in their existence
(assuming jovians are as equally likely as humans to be you). However,
jovians all share the same characteristic C = ‘being jovian’ that you and
I do not possess. These effects cancel one another so that you retain your
original prior (see Garriga and Vilenkin (2008)). A philosopher who agrees
with Bostrom, however, would not retain her original prior. Consider The
Presumptuous Philosopher II :
Suppose that in the not too distant future we discover evidence
of a vast alien civilization that once ruled our galaxy but that
is now extinct. After considering all of the evidence, scientists
believe that only two candidate theories about the civilization
are plausible, T1 and T2. According to T1, the civilization
was very, very large and produced a total of a trillion trillion
observers. According to T2, the civilization was very, very,
very large and produced a total of a trillion trillion trillion
observers. Scientists currently believe both these theories are
equally likely and are preparing a simple experiment that will
falsify one of them. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: “Hey
guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment,
because I can already show to you that T1 is about a trillion
times more likely to be true than T2!”
For the philosopher who agrees with Bostrom, if T1 is true, it does not
make her any more likely to exist. However, it does make her approxi-
mately 1 trillion times more likely to be one of the 7× 1010 humans who
have existed (rather than one of the aliens). Because, of course, she is hu-
4This example is first discussed in Neal (2006) and Hartle and Srednicki (2007).
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man, the philosopher believes T1 to be about a trillion times more likely
than T2 – a presumptuous belief that Bostrom shares with the philosopher
but that the original presumptuous philosopher and I do not.
B. Presumptuous assumptions
The Presumptuous Philosopher (PP) depends on two assumptions which
are both rather presumptuous: (1) the PP assumes the philosopher is
certain her existence is highly atypical under T1 and (2) the PP assumes
the philosopher is certain all alternative theories which produce many
people are false.
For the PP to work, the philosopher must be certain that her existence
is atypical under T1, i.e., she must certain that the number of possible
people is much larger than a trillion trillion, N ≫ 1 trillion trillion.
Suppose that N < 1 trillion trillion so that the philosopher is likely to
exist under both theories; then she would not strongly prefer T2 to T1.
P (E|T1) ≈ P (E|T2) ≈ 1, and she approximately retains her prior belief in
both theories, P (T1|E) ≈ P (T1) and P (T2|E) ≈ P (T2).
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To make this point more explicit, suppose that – surprise, surprise – physi-
cists ignore the presumptuous philosopher and perform their experiment
anyway. They find, to the philosopher’s astonishment, that T2 is false and
the world is not very, very, very big. Would the philosopher then think,
“The experiment was 1 trillion times more likely to find T1 false than T2.
We just have to accept that our universe is very special, 1 trillion times
more special than it would have been had we found T1 false.” Bostrom
thinks so, but I do not. Instead, she is much more likely to question her
original assumptions such as her belief that the number of possible people
is larger than a trillion trillion. Keep in mind that a possible person is not
the same as possible instances of a possible person. I could have had red
hair instead of brown, or perhaps even been a jovian instead of a human,
etc. In these alternative cases, of which there are many, I am different
instances of the same possible person and account for only 1 out of the
N number of possible people. Although it may seem unlikely, perhaps N
really is less than a trillion trillion.
5Neal (2006) was the first to point out that if you believe the universe is large
enough to make your existence likely, then you neither favor nor disfavor theories that
posit an even larger universe.
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Let us suppose that N is certainly larger than a trillion trillion so that the
previous considerations are not important. The PP still requires that the
philosopher be certain all alternative theories which produce many people
are false. As before, suppose that physicists have shown T2 false – a
result they repeat over and over so that we are certain it is correct. Must
the philosopher then reluctantly accept T1 true, all the while believing
T1 a 1 in 1 trillion fluke? Of course not. She is much more likely to
accept alternatives to T1 that produce many people, such as the many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics or the existence of multiple
universes. For example, suppose the philosopher believes it plausible that
the cosmos is exactly as T1 describes, but also with many quantum worlds.
Then the philosopher would not be so surprised to find that T2 is false.
There are plenty of people in “T1+many worlds” that her existence is
already likely. For the PP argument to work, the philosopher must be
certain (up to 1 trillion to 1 odds) that quantum many worlds (and any
other theory that produces many people) is incorrect. It is hard to justify
such certainty that these theories are false.
The presumptuous philosopher, therefore, is presumptuous not because
she reasons as though existing people are pulls from the set of possible
people, instead she is presumptuous because she is certain that the number
of possible people is larger than a trillion trillion and because she is certain
that every other theory that generates many people is false.
C. It is already plausible that you exist
If you believe, as many cosmologists do, that there is not one single uni-
verse, but many universes collectively referred to as the multiverse and
furthermore, that there are many quantum worlds branching out of each
of these universes, then it is almost certain the number of realized people
is larger than N and there are multiple instances of you (Garriga and
Vilenkin (2008), Page (2010), and Srednicki and Hartle (2010)).
Given your existence is already plausible, “crazy” ideas such as Olum’s
1010
100
planet-multiplier theory are not needed to make your existence
more likely. It is not true your prior belief in Olum’s theory needs to be
less than 1/1010
100
in order to dismiss it. Priors as low as 1/103 will do, as
long as you agree your existence is already likely without use of Olum’s
theory.
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IV. The Devil’s Existence in Many Worlds
Suppose The Devil’s Existence (DE) thought experiment is updated to al-
low for the possibility that many civilizations exist. There is either a single
civilization or many civilizations. If there is a single civilization, then the
experiment is run once exactly as before. If there are many civilizations,
then the experiment is run simultaneously in many parallel worlds with
many civilizations created – so many in fact, that every possible person
is almost sure to exist. If the Devil exists (i.e., if civilizations tend to be
small), then he destroys the excess rooms in each of the worlds so that
all civilizations contain 10 people. If the Devil does not exist (i.e., if civ-
ilizations tend to be large), then all rooms are filled and all civilizations
contain 1 million people.
There are four possibilities. Either the Devil exists and there is a single
civilization (label the theory that this is true T1,S), the Devil exists and
there are many civilizations (T1,M), the Devil does not exist and there
is a single civilization (T2,S), or the Devil does not exist and there are
many civilizations (T2,M). Your task is to determine which of these four
theories is correct. Suppose, as before, you exist and find yourself in
room 7. Assuming you initially believe the theories equally likely before
considering this information, which of the four theories is now most likely
to be true?
Because many, many people are created in T1,M and T2,M , it is almost
certain that you exist if one of these theories is correct. Furthermore, it
is likely there are many instances of you. In the calculations that follow,
I assume that if you exist, your current instance, i.e., the existing person
in which you are currently embodied, is chosen randomly from the set of
all of your instances. Notice that this assumption is different from (and
in addition to) reasoning as though existing people are random pulls from
the set of possible people.6
6This distinction is very important. Suppose that if the Devil does not exist, then
God generates monkeys in the last 999,990 rooms (see Olum (2002)). I can still assume
that my current instance is chosen randomly from the set of all of my instances, but I
could (and probably should) assign a very low probability that a monkey is one of my
instances. When you split your reasoning into two parts: (1) determining when and
where your instances exist and (2) determining which instance of “you” you currently
experience, then the reference class problems discussed in Bostrom (2002) disappear.
Instead, you are left with the much more palatable problem of assigning probabilities
that a particular type of object is one of your instances.
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To update your beliefs, you need an estimate for N . Here, I will assume
that N = 210
15
, which is based on the number of possible neural connec-
tions in the human brain (see Page (2010)). The actual number is not of
consequence below, only the assumption that it is a very large but finite
number is important.
Define the following four probabilities,
P1 ≡ P (D|E, T1,S)P (E|T1,S)P (T1,S),
≈ 1/10× 10/210
15
× 1/4,
≈ 0.
P2 ≡ P (D|E, T1,M)P (E|T1,M)P (T1,M),
≈ 1/10× 1× 1/4,
≈ 1/40.
P3 ≡ P (D|E, T2,S)P (E|T2,S)P (T2,S),
≈ 1/106 × 106/210
15
× 1/4,
≈ 0.
P4 ≡ P (D|E, T2,M)P (E|T2,M)P (T2,M),
≈ 1/106 × 1× 1/4,
≈ 1/(4× 106).
According to Bayes’ Law,
P (T1,S|D,E) =
P1
P1 + P2 + P3 + P4
≈ 0,
P (T1,M |D,E) =
P2
P1 + P2 + P3 + P4
≈ 0.99999,
P (T2,S|D,E) =
P3
P1 + P2 + P3 + P4
≈ 0,
P (T2,M |D,E) =
P4
P1 + P2 + P3 + P4
≈ 0.00001.
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Therefore, after discovering that you exist and are in room 7, you should
believe with almost certainty that there are many civilizations and that
the Devil exists so that all of these civilizations are small.
The above argument is immune to the criticism that Bartha and Hitchcock
(1999) and Olum (2002) level against the original Doomsday Argument.7
In fact, the above argument depends critically on their insight – that when
analyzing the DA, we should reason as though existing people are random
pulls from the set of possible people.
A. Are many civilizations plausible?
How plausible is it that many civilizations exist? In the above argument
I assumed your priors were all equal, meaning you initially believed it
equally likely that there are many, many civilizations or only one. Al-
though we have no evidence that other civilizations exist, it is still very
plausible that they do. From what we know of our vast universe, there
appears to be sufficiently many other worlds (causally separated regions of
space-time) such that many, many other civilizations exist (Garriga and
Vilenkin (2008), Page (2010), and Srednicki and Hartle (2010)).
Even if you initially think it implausible that many civilizations exist, then
as long as you agree to the following:
(1) There are a very, very large but finite number of possible people.8
(2) You are an instance of one of these possible people.
(3) You exist in a civilization that has so far produced 7× 1010 people.
then reasoning as though existing people are random pulls from the set of
possible people forces you to drastically increase your initial belief (what-
ever it is) that many other civilizations exist. This does not mean you
are forced to accept any “crazy” theory that produces more civilizations
with more people. Instead it means you should increase your belief in the
7However, note that if we assume the total number of existing people, x, is always
much less than the number of possible people, N , no matter how many civilizations
exist, then the Doomsday Argument (even in many worlds) would fail.
8For example, you might believe that a particular complex arrangement of matter
specifies each possible person and that there are many such arrangements corresponding
to many possible people. Presumably for humans, the complex arrangement of matter
that determines who is in which body is located somewhere in the brain.
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general theory that there are many other civilizations. Exactly how and
where these civilizations exist is up for debate.
B. Alternative (incorrect) treatments of the DA in many
worlds
Both Leslie (1996) and Olum (2002) briefly consider a many worlds version
of the Doomsday Argument. In the context of the DE, their analysis
amounts to assuming the following: God fills the first 10 rooms with
people and then flips a fair coin to determine whether or not the Devil
exists (heads, he exists and tails, he does not). As before, if the Devil
exists, he destroys the remaining rooms. Many worlds is interpreted as
running the experiment many times, each time with a separate coin flip.
Your task is to determine whether the coin landed heads or tails in your
run of the experiment.
Unfortunately, the setup that Leslie and Olum adopt is not very useful. It
assumes the cosmos produces civilizations that have a 1/2 chance of ex-
periencing a doom event. Suppose the cosmos is different such that doom
events are nearly certain and most civilizations are small, or alternatively,
that doom events are rare so that most civilizations are large, or possibly
even that doom events have a 3/4 chance of occurring. Unfortunately, you
cannot consider any of these possibilities. You are forced to accept that
doom for your civilization is determined by the flip of a fair coin. Faced
with this imposed reality, your task is to discern whether the coin toss
lands heads or tails for your civilization. But here, again, the experiment
makes little sense. It is rather silly to ask someone, “With what proba-
bility will a fair coin toss land heads?”, yet we ask just this question to
everyone in rooms 1 through 10. Perhaps we should not be surprised when
their answer is 1/2.
Instead of asking the participants the outcome of a fair coin toss, we
should be asking them their belief in different theories about the bias of
the coin. When formulating the DE in many worlds, I considered only
two possibilities for the existence of a doom event. Either the probability
of doom is zero and all civilizations are large or the probability of doom is
one and all civilizations are small. Of course, if I wanted to be thorough,
I would have included many other possibilities, including the possibility
that doom occurs with probability 1/2 (which Leslie and Olum assume).
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Suppose I added other possibilities for you to decide between. The final
result would remain unchanged: after considering your circumstance (that
you exist and are in room 7), you would drastically increase your belief
that many civilizations exist and nearly all of these civilizations are small.9
C. Universal Doomsday
Knobe, Olum, and Vilenkin (2006) present a Universal Doomsday Argu-
ment where they assume the universe is infinite (with many civilizations)
and then show that given our birth number, we should drastically increase
our belief that almost all civilizations are short-lived. Their conclusion is
nearly identical to what I state here, but I have reservations about their
analysis. They use Bayes’ Law to update the estimate of the frequency
of short-lived civilizations in our universe, i.e., the probability that a ran-
domly selected civilization in our universe is short-lived. Let P (S) be our
estimate of this probability and let P (L) = 1 − P (S) be our estimate
of the probability that a randomly selected civilization in our universe is
long-lived. Let xS be the number of people in a short-lived civilization,
let xL be the number of people in a long-lived civilization, and assume
xL ≫ xS. Our data, D, is our birth number, 7× 10
10. They state,
P (S|D) =
P (D|S)P (S)
P (D|S)P (S) + P (D|L)P (L)
.
and furthermore that,
P (D|S) = 1/xS,
P (D|L) = 1/xL.
Since xL ≫ xS , P (D|S) ≫ P (D|L) and thus P (S|D) is nearly 1 un-
less P (S) is extremely small. Therefore, according to Knobe, Olum, and
Vilenkin, we should believe that nearly all civilizations are small when
conditioning on our birth number. However, they have used S and L to
denote different things at different points in their analysis. In their priors,
S and L denote that a randomly selected civilization in our universe is
9Suppose I included T3,S and T3,M , which both state that a doom event occurs with
probability 1/2 on each run of the experiment, but with a single and many civilization(s)
respectively. If all six theories are initially equally likely, then P (T3,S |D,E) ≈ 0,
P (T3,M |D,E) ≈ 0.00002, and the clear choice would still be T1,M with P (T1,M |D,E) ≈
0.99997.
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short-lived and long-lived respectively. In their likelihoods, S and L de-
note that our civilization is short-lived and long-lived respectively. If we
make S and L consistent across the priors and likelihoods, then the final
result is ruined.
Instead of using Bayes’ Law to update our estimate of the frequency of
short-lived and long-lived civilizations in our universe (as Knobe, Olum,
and Vilenkin attempt), I think we should update our beliefs in different
theories about the frequency of short-lived and long-lived civilizations in
our universe. For example, suppose I believe that either all civilizations in
our universe are short-lived, TS, or that all civilizations in our universe are
long-lived, TL. I don’t know which of these theories is correct and would
like to update my prior belief in both theories after considering my birth
number. Suppose my prior belief in TS is P (TS), and my prior belief in
TL is P (TL) = 1− P (TS). Therefore,
P (TS|D) =
P (D|TS)P (TS)
P (D|TS)P (TS) + P (D|TL)P (TL)
.
and
P (D|TS) = 1/xS,
P (D|TL) = 1/xL.
Since xL ≫ xS , P (D|TS)≫ P (D|TL) and thus P (TS|D) is nearly 1 unless
P (TS) is extremely small. If Knobe, Olum, and Vilenkin had presented
their argument in this way, then I would agree with their statement, “we
should now think that almost all civilizations will be short-lived – a sort
of ‘universal doomsday’.”
V. Conclusion
Consider our current circumstance: we exist in a civilization that has
produced only 70 billion people. At first sight, our data seems highly
unlikely. If our civilization dies out soon so that it is ultimately small,
then not that many people exist and it is highly unlikely that you and
I are alive. If our civilization is ultimately very, very large, then our
existence might be explained, but it is highly unlikely for you and I to
have such low birth numbers. Given the situation, we can either accept
that we are atypical or we can seek plausible alternative theories that
15
better explain our data.
Here, I have considered the following theory: there are many, many civi-
lizations that exist and nearly all of these civilizations are small. Under
this theory, our existence is certain and our birth number is typical. Be-
cause the theory makes our circumstance likely and alternatives do not,
we should drastically increase our belief that the theory is true when con-
ditioning on our data.
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